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NOTES
Miranda Right-to-Counsel Violations and the Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
There is a jurisdictional split on the relatively narrow issue of whether
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to Miranda violations of the
invocation of the right to counsel.' These are known as Edwards2-tainted
violations. Much of the confusion in this area of criminal procedure can be
traced to the two-level nature of the Miranda warnings themselves.3 There
is the specific procedural warning itself-in this case, the notification of the
right to counsel-and there is the actual invocation of the right by the
suspect.4 This Note will not address directly the issue of the use or exclusion
of evidence derived from the failure by the police to give the required Miranda
warnings.5 Rather, this Note only addresses the question of whether the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine6 should apply to violations of a suspect's
invocation of his right to counsel. In fact, as this Note will demonstrate,
the poisonous fruits doctrine definitionally applies to all first generation
derivative evidence after Miranda violations. 7 The narrower question is whether
I. Compare United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine) with Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1092 (1982) (declining to apply the poisonous tree doctrine).
2. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The first-level warnings are well-known. A
person in custodial interrogation must be given four warnings: (1) you have the right to remain
silent; (2) anything you say can be used against you in court; (3) you have the right to the
presence of an attorney; and (4) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed prior
to any questioning if you so desire. The second level of the Miranda warnings is their actual
invocation. This Note addresses the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to
violations of the invocation of the right to counsel at its second level.
4. This seems to be a critical distinction. The United States Supreme Court has been very
protective of persons who have invoked their right to counsel. See infra notes 172-282 and
accompanying text.
5. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (rejecting application of the fruits doctrine
to a suspect's subsequent confession despite an earlier unwarned confession); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (refusing to exclude the testimony of a witness discovered after
a failure by police to warn the suspect he had a right to appointed counsel when the other
warnings were given).
6. The fullest explication of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine can be found in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Illegally obtained evidence (the poison tree) is
sometimes used to generate derivative evidence (the poison fruit). Since the poison tree's first
generation evidence must be suppressed, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine argues that
derivative generation evidence should also be suppressed.
7. For example, the unwarned confession in Elstad was automatically suppressed. Justice
O'Connor stated, "Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed ......
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. This is a classic example of the application of fruit of the poisonous
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the fruits doctrine applies to second, and remoter, generation derivative
evidence once there has been an Edwards-tainted violation.
This is still an open issue. The United States Supreme Court, in both
Michigan v. Tucker' and Oregon v. Elstad,9 refused to apply the poisonous
fruits doctrine after procedural Miranda violations.' 0 Elstad may even stand
for the larger proposition that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine never
applies to procedural violations of Miranda." There is a distinction, however,
between the failure to read a suspect his right(s) and a violation of that
right once the suspect has tried to invoke it. This issue will remain open
until the Supreme Court grants certiorari in the appropriate case. Elstad did
not conclusively dispose of this issue.
This Note will highlight the problem by first focusing on the different
approaches used by the split jurisdictions. The Note will then turn to a short
history of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and a review of the
purposes underlying the exclusionary rule. This Note will then examine the
notion of prophylactic or procedural safeguards in contradistinction to con-
stitutional rights in part three. The analysis will touch on Tucker and Elstad
and Miranda itself. The real question is whether the right to counsel, once
invoked by a suspect in custodial interrogation, is itself a constitutional right.
Part four examines the relationship between the fifth and sixth amendment
rights to counsel. The Supreme Court, both in the fifth and sixth amendment
contexts, has shown itself to be especially protective of the right to counsel.
Part five will propose a solution to the jurisdictional split.12
I. THE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT
A. Downing
In United States v. Downing,'3 the First Circuit identified three issues
which should be addressed in determining whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied to the fruits of an Edwards-tainted violation. The threshold
inquiry is whether there has been a violation of a suspect's invocation of
his right to counsel in a custodial interrogation setting.' 4 The second-and
tree doctrine to first generation derivative evidence. The poisonous tree here is the failure by
the police to give any Miranda warnings at all. The excluded fruit is the unwarned confession.
8. 417 U.S. 433.
9. 470 U.S. 298.
10. Justice O'Connor's long discussion of the inapplicability of the fruits doctrine in the
context of Elstad's facts focuses primarily on the voluntary nature of both the pre-warned and
post-warned confessions and the procedural nature of the Miranda violation. See id. at 1290-
96. A procedural violation is one in which the required manner of reading the Miranda warnings
is not complied with.
11. See infra notes 109-71 and accompanying text.
12. Justice O'Connor noted in Elstad that this whole area of criminal procedure lends itself
to colorful metaphor. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303.
13. 665 F.2d 404 (Ist Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 406.
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the major focus of this Note-is whether the fruits of such a violation slould
be admitted.' 5 Finally, the court should inquire whether the challenged evi-
dence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.' 6
The defendant, John Downing, was arrested in 1980 by Maine State Police
for narcotics violations. He was advised of his Miranda rights at that time.
He initially waived those rights and answered police questioning. Downing
then stated he wished to see his lawyer before answering further questions. 7
The police transferred Downing to another building for booking proce-
dures. A federal customs officer took over the processing and questioning
of the suspect. The state police officers failed to tell the customs officer
that Downing had requested assistance of counsel. The federal agent also
did not inquire whether Downing had asserted any of his rights. The customs
officer told Downing he did not have to answer any questions, but did not
give the full set of Miranda warnings. Downing's lawyer was never called.' 8
The customs agent took down some biographical information. He then
asked Downing to empty his pockets. Downing did so, and surrendered
various objects, including a set of keys. The customs agent asked what the
keys were used for. Downing said he used them for his airplane and,
responding to further questioning, he told the customs agent the location
of his plane. This was the first knowledge the police had that the defendant
owned an airplane. Eventually the police secured a search warrant, searched
the plane and found evidence later introduced against defendant at his trial,
and also secured statements from employees at the airport which implicated
the defendant in the charged drug conspiracy.' 9
The district court held there had been an Edwards violation, and that
both the intangible and third-party testimonial evidence discovered as a result
of that violation had to be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.20
In affirming, the First Circuit methodically set forth a series of reasons
for applying the exclusionary sanction to fruits of Edwards-tainted viola-
tions.2' The first inquiry, as in all Miranda cases, is whether there is custodial
interrogation. The court applied the Rhode Island v. Innis3 test,2 and
15. Id. at 407.
16. Id. at 409.




21. Id. at 406-09.
22. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
23. Miranda kicks in when there is (1) police interrogation in (2) a custodial setting. The
Innis test goes to the interrogation prong. Interrogation, under Innis, "refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
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determined that the federal customs agent was custodially interrogating
Downing.
The second and crucial inquiry was whether there had been an Edwards
violation. The First Circuit noted:
The [Supreme] Court has recently stated in clear terms that "an accused
has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation." Moreover, once an accused requests the
presence of counsel, he "is not subject, to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conver-
sations with police."'
The government conceded that Downing had not initiated conversation about
the keys. Since'the defendant's request for counsel had not been honored,
the court found an Edwards violation. Edwards requires the suppression of
first generation derivative evidence, that is, Downing's statements.Y It is not
clear whether Edwards also requires suppression of remoter generation de-
rivative evidence, that is, evidence found in the airplane. 26 The First Circuit
found that it did. 27
The First Circuit rejected the argument that Michigan v. Tucker had
answered this question. 2 The court distinguished Tucker on a number of
grounds, most notably that the violation in that case had been procedural. 29
The court held that Edwards plus Miranda added up to a full-fledged fifth
amendment right to counsel.3 0 Once a constitutional right has been violated,
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies.3 The chief justification for
the use of the exclusionary rule in any setting is the deterrence of unlawful
behavior by the police.3 2 The court cited the Massachusetts case of Com-
monwealth v. White, 33 and noted "[tihe possibility of obtaining admissible
derivative evidence would seem to remove much of the incentive for police
to follow the dictates of Miranda.' 34 The court even suggested that its reading
24. Downing, 665 F.2d at 406 (citations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 482, 484-85 (1980)).
25. Edwards, 451 U.S. 477.
26. Edwards only addressed first generation derivative evidence when the invocation of
Miranda's right to counsel had been disregarded.
27. Downing, 665 F.2d 404.
28. Id. at 407.
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id. at 408-09.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 409.
33. 374 Mass. 132, 371 N.E.2d 777 (1977), aff'd by an equally divided court, 439 U.S. 280
(1978). White is the leading state case applying the fruits doctrine to Edwards-tainted violations.
34. Downing, 665 F.2d at 409 n.5. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in White also sup-
pressed the fruits of Edwards-tainted violations. "To hold otherwise," the court noted, "would,
in effect, sanction the initial violations of constitutional guaranties which the judge found took
place in the police barracks." White, 374 Mass. at 139, 371 N.E.2d at 781.
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of Tucker indicated the Tucker Court was ready to Apply the fruits doctrine
if an actual fifth amendment violation had beeii found.5
The deterrence rationale as used by the Downing court seems appropriate
given the facts of the police behavior in this case. The Maine State Police
officers read Downing his rights, but refused to honor his attempt to invoke
his Edwards right to counsel. Instead, the Maine officers turned Downing
over to a federal customs inspector and failed to inform the customs officer
that Downing had invoked his right to counsel. The police should not be
allowed tO pass along their mistakes to each other.3 6 The customs officer
himself failed to reacquaint Downing with his Miranda rights. The second
round of custodial interrogation thus involved both a violation of the first-
level procedural Miranda rights and a violation of the second-level Edwards
right to counsel. The use of the exclusionary rule here would likely have
the effect of deterring future similar misconduct like that at issue in Downing.
The real issue is whether the Miranda-based Edwards right to counsel is
a constitutional right. If it is, there seems little doubt the Downing court
correctly concluded the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should apply.37
Other courts have simply sidestepped the issue.38 The Georgia Supreme Court,
on the other hand, has read Edwards as announcing another prophylactic
rule, and has explicitly declined to apply the fruits doctrine's exclusionary
sanction in the absence of a contrary holding by the United States Supreme
Court.
B. Wilson v. Zant39
Joseph Wilson, Jr., the defendant in the Georgia case, was arrested at
home around 6:30 on the morning of February 27, 1979, in connection with
a drug-related kidnapping and murder. The police immediately read Wilson
his Miranda warnings and then took him to the Forsyth County Sheriff's
Department. The interrogation of the defendant by Sergeant J.C. Adams
began near 8:00 a.m. and continued until Wilson requested an attorney. The
request was not honored. Sergeant Adams instead again read Wilson his
35. Downing, 665 F.2d at 408 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 443, 445-46 (1974)).
36. "Law enforcement officers working in teams should be discouraged from violating the
accused's constitutional rights by failing to ascertain or advise one another whether those rights
had been previously asserted." Downing, 665 F.2d at 407. The Supreme Court has used this
same rationale in a fourth amendment context involving a constitutionally defective warrant.
See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
37. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Elstad casts considerable doubt on this conclusion,
however. Elstad seems to hold that a Miranda violation is not a consitutional violation. But
see the discussion of Elstad, infra at notes 146-171 and accompanying text.
38. See United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1983); State v. King, 140 Ariz.
602, 684 P.2d 174 (1984) (both courts choosing to leave the Edwards-tainted fruit of the
poisonous tree issue open).
39. 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982).
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Miranda rights. Wilson then signed a waiver form and gave an incriminating
statement to the police, from which three items of derivative evidence were
obtained. 4°
Wilson was subsequently convicted of murder, kidnapping with bodily
injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He
was given the death sentence f6r the murder conviction. 4'
Wilson appealed through the Georgia court system on the grounds that
both the intangible and third-party testimonial evidence used to convict him
were suppressible fruits of an Edwards-tainted violation.42
The lower Georgia courts disagreed, and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the fruits of statements obtained in violation of
prophylactic rules are not necessarily subject to the exclusionary sanction. 43
The issues before the Georgia court were precisely the issues the First
Circuit had addressed in Downing." Downing, in fact, was cited by the
Georgia court and rejected. 45 The Georgia court relied principally on state-
ments in Michigan v. Tucker4 6 in which, in the words of the Georgia court,
"the [Supreme] Court held that the 'fruit'.of a statement procured by police
when the defendant had not been advised of his right to appointed counsel
did not fall within the ambit of the exclusionary rule."' 47 The Georgia court
drew no distinction between first- and second-level Miranda rights to counsel
violations. The entire right to counsel in the Miranda context was held to
be a prophylactic safeguard, protecting a person's fifth amendment right
not to incriminate oneself compulsorily. 48
The Georgia court agreed with the general proposition from the United
States Supreme Court that "[t]he 'fruit' of a statement which was obtained
in violation of a constitutional right must be suppressed. ' 49 The Georgia
court did not read Edwards as announcing such a right. "We understand
Edwards to be an application of the prophylactic rules of Miranda. '50 No
40. Id. at 375-76, 290 S.E.2d at 445-46 (the items included a photo, a toy gun, and live
witness testimony).
41. Id. at 373, 290 S.E.2d at 444.
42. Id. at 376, 290 S.E.2d at 446.
43. Id. at 378, 290 S.E.2d at 447-48.
44. Nevertheless, the Georgia Supreme Court made one finding which may be significant
in determining whether Wong Sun should apply to Edwards violations. The court found that
Wilson's incriminating statement, despite the Edwards violation, was voluntary. "We therefore
hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary statement
obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, and that it was not error to admit the 'fruits'
of the defendant's statement in this case." Id. at 378-79, 290 S.E.2d at 448 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
45. Id. at 378, 290 S.E.2d at 447.
46. 417 U.S. 433.






distinction was drawn between a violation of the mere reading of the rules
themselves and the attempt to invoke one of the Miranda rights.
The Georgia court held that Edwards did dictate the exclusion of the
defendant's incriminating statements, but that the fruits were admissible.'
The Georgia court noted that in the face of an "unresolved constitutional
question," 52 it was free to extend or not extend the exclusionary rule, and
it chose not to do soY3
The fundamental difference between the First Circuit and the Georgia
Supreme Court is that the Georgia court refused to draw a distinction between
the required reading of the Miranda warnings and the rights those rules
represented. Both were prophylactic. A violation of a prophylactic right did
not require the suppression of evidence under the poisonous fruits doctrine.
Only the violation of a constitutional right brought the exclusionary sanction
into play. Under the Georgia view Miranda actually involved three levels of
"rights," and two of the levels were merely prophylactic. The right to be
read the warnings, and the actual invocation of any of those rights, were
mere procedural devices. The Miranda-and Edwards-Court had announced
those "rights" only as protective safeguards. The only constitutional right
was the third-level right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.
The split jurisdictions agree that the fruits doctrine applies whenever a
constitutional right is violated.54 The split, then, derives from contrary read-
ings of Edwards, and Miranda and its progeny. In large part the split comes
from different understandings of the complicated distinction drawn by the
Supreme Court at various times between prophylactic and constitutional
rights.55
II. CHInsE PuzzLES: THE FRUiT OF THE POISONOUS TrEE
DOCTRINE
A. Silverthorne
The earliest statement by the Supreme Court of the essential components
of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 6 can be found in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States17 Justice Holmes delivered the opinion for the
51. Id. at 378-79, 290 S.E.2d at 447-48.
52. Id. at 378, 290 S.E.2d at 447.
53. Id. at 378-79, 290 S.E.2d at 448.
54. As noted before, the Supreme Court may not agree. See infra notes 109-171 and
accompanying text.
55. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463, 490 (1966); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439;
Oregon v. Elstad 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985).
56. For a sweeping overview of the doctrine in many contexts, see Pitler, "The Fruit of
the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAin. L. REv. 579 (1968).
57. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
19871 1067
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Court. Holmes wrote "[t]he facts are smple [sic]," 8 and went on to sketch
an elegant outline of the future fruits doctrine in a very brief opinion.
Two Silverthornes were arrested at their homes in the early hours of
February 25, 1919. They were held in custody for several hours. During
their detentions members of the Justice Department and a United States
Marshall "without a shadow of authority went to the office of their company
and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found
there." ' 9 The illegally seized documents were eventually returned, though
photographs and copies of the most important papers were made.60 Sub-
poenas based on information contained in the copied documents were pre-
pared ordering the production of the originals. The Silverthornes refused to
comply. The district court held them in contempt, and the case was brought
to the Supreme Court on a writ of error.6'
Holmes called the seizure an "outrage" 62 and wrote that the issue "could
not be presented more nakedly.''63 The issue which Holmes peremptorily
decided was whether derivative evidence could be used against a defendant
despite its acquisition by the government through illegal means. "The Gov-
ernment now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure,
seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that
means which otherwise it would not have had."' 4 Holmes wrote that this
meant the government needed to take "two steps' 65 instead of one to use
the evidence it otherwise could not use. Relying on Weeks v. United States,6
Holmes then extended the scope of the exclusionary sanction to the derivative
use of the illegally seized evidence:
In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment
to a form of words .... The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used
at all.67
The combination of the egregious governmental behavior here with the logical
extension of Weeks' exclusionary sanction were all Holmes needed to reverse
the contempt judgments against the Silverthornes.
Holmes added that simply because facts had been illegally acquired did
not mean they had "become sacred and inaccessible. ' 6 The same facts "[if]
58. Id. at 390.
59. Id. (emphasis. added).
60. Id. at 391.
61. Id. at 390-91. The amount of the fine assessed for the contempt was only $250.
62. Id. at 391.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 392.
66. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).




. . .gained from an independent source... may be proved like any others,
but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used
by it in the way proposed." '69
Though not yet named, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had been
established as law in the federal courts, or at least as fourth amendment
law. The doctrine in its most naked form held three notions: (1) evidence
illegally gained could not be used in any way;70 (2) the government was not
to profit in any manner from its own illegality;71 and (3) the underlying
facts were not immunized and other evidence of those facts would be ad-
missible so long as they were developed by an independent source.72
B. Nardone
As students of fourth amendment law well know, the simplest statement
of a new rule inevitably leads to elaborations of that rule, and refinements,
and complications. Silverthorne was followed nineteen years later by Nardone
v. United States.71 Justice Frankfurter applied Holmes' Silverthorne doctrine
to evidence gained from information acquired through an illegal wiretap. 74
The doctrine was fleshed out, and it was also given its unforgettable name
with Frankfurter's felicitous phrase. The accused was to be given a chance
"to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of
the poisonous tree." 75
Nardone suggested a different approach to the exclusion of derivative
evidence, however. It noted that a balancing of interests was involved. There
was a heavy price to pay whenever "logically relevant [evidence] in criminal
prosecutions" 76 was excluded. Frankfurter had identified the concern which
would influence both Rehnquist and O'Connor later in their separate de-
cisions not to apply the fruits doctrine to Miranda violations, at least in a
procedural context. It was a hard thing to lose competent evidence. "[T]wo
opposing concerns must be harmonized: on the one hand, the stern enforce-
ment of the criminal law; on the other, protection of that realm of privacy
left free by Constitution and laws but capable of infringement either through
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. This was the fruit of the poisonous tree exclusionary sanction rationale.
71. This was the deterrence rationale.
72. This was the tempering component of the doctrine. Eventually it would be elaborated
to allow the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence not only if developed through an
independent source, but also if there had been attenuation, Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); or harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), at least as
applied by the lower courts, see Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982); or an
inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
73. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
74. Id. at 341.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 340.
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zeal or design." ' 77 "Zeal or design" apparently meant that both willful and
negligent errors by the police, if illegal, would lead to the exclusion of
otherwise competent derivative evidence.
Nardone is particularly interesting because the fruits doctrine was applied
to a nonconstitutional violation. The poison tree here was the illegal wiretap
in contravention of section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.78 The
Court could have used the fourth amendment as the basis for its decision,
but it explicitly did not.79 The insistence that the fruits doctrine only applied
to constitutional violations was a creation of later constituencies of the
Supreme Court. Frankfurter thought otherwise. Application of the fruits
doctrine for deterrent purposes was not the essential consideration. The
balance had to be made. Application of the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine "must be justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the
Constitution or the law of the land.'"80
Nardone extended the scope of the exclusionary rule as applied through
the fruits doctrine to evidence derived from violations of the Constitution
or "the law of the land." Nardone's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
was not mechanical at all. The question was not whether there had been a
constitutional violation by the police. The question was whether there had
been police illegality of any kind. That still did not answer the (in)-admis-
sibility of the evidence. The trial court still had to be convinced there was
a solid connection between the alleged police illegality and the proffered
evidence. 8' Frankfurter explained that the rationale behind the fruits doctrine
was that "[t]o forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to
put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods
deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal lib-
erty.' ''82
Nardone adopted Silverthorne's independent source doctrine, 3 and, in
another felicitous turn of phrase by Frankfurter, added one of its own. "As
a matter of good sense," Frankfurter wrote, "such connection may have
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' '84
The core of Nardone was Frankfurter's reasonable approach to criminal
procedure. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was not a bright-line
rule capable of ready application if only a threshold showing-such as a
constitutional violation-was made. "The civilized conduct of criminal trials
cannot be confined within mechanical rules .... Such a system as ours must,
77. Id.
78. Id. at 339.
79. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 340.
82. Id. at 340 (citing Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)).
83. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
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within the limits here indicated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness
and courage of federal trial judges.""s
The Warren and Burger Courts, in contrast, were often in search of bright-
line rules. Miranda itself announced the brightest of the bright-line rules.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, as announced in Silverthorne and
especially Nardone, was decidedly not a bright-line doctrine. Bright-line rules
call for bright-line responses. Miranda and the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine were like oil and water, and came from different fundamental
conceptions of the application of the law of criminal procedure.
C. Wong Sun
Wong Sun v. United States 6 added a final element to the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. In order to object to the use of any evidence, even
if illegally seized, a person had to have standing. 1 The test was whether a
personal "right of privacy of person or premises" had been invaded. 8
Wong Sun's fact pattern was more complicated than the fact patterns in
Silverthorne and Nardone. After the initial standing inquiry had been an-
swered, however, the essential application of the doctrine remained the same.
Wong Sun, nevertheless, is the leading fruit of the poisonous tree decision.
It is the case on which courts rely when deciding whether to apply the fruits
doctrine to Edwards violations.
At 2 a.m. on June 4, 1959, Hom Way was arrested in San Francisco's
Chinatown. Hom Way had an ounce of heroin in his possession. Horn Way
said he had purchased the ounce from "Blackie Toy," and that "Blackie
Toy" ran a laundry on Leavenworth Street 9
At six that same morning several federal agents went to 1733 Leavenworth
Street and knocked on the door of a business named "Oye's Laundry."
The laundry was run by defendant James Wah Toy (hereinafter Toy), but
nothing in the trial record indicated this Toy and "Blackie Toy" were the
same person. After a short conversation one of the agents stated, "I am a
federal narcotics agent." 9 Toy took off running. The federal agents pursued
Toy, broke down the door leading into his apartment, and followed him
into his bedroom where they handcuffed him and placed him under arrest.
Toy then incriminated himself and a person named Johnny Yee. Toy said
both he and Johnny Yee had smoked some heroin the night before. The
federal agents had no warrant. 9'
85. Id. at 342.
86. 371 U.S. 471.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 492.
89. Id. at 473.




Johnny Yee was then arrested and just under an .ounce of heroin was
taken from a bureau drawer in his bedroom. Both Yee and Toy were taken
to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yee said his heroin had been given to him four
days earlier by Toy and someone named "Sea Dog." Toy identified "Sea
Dog" as Wong Sun. Wong Sun was then arrested, also without a warrant.
No additional drugs were found. 92
Toy, Yee, and Wong Sun were arraigned and later interrogated. 93 Toy
and Wong Sun both made further incriminating statements to police which
they refused to sign. 94 Yee was the government's principal witness. Hom
Way did not testify and was not charged. 95
Four evidentiary items were challenged by Toy and Wong Sun as fruits
of various poison trees, either of "unlawful arrests or of attendant searches." 96
The four items included: (1) Toy's statements in his bedroom at the time of
his unlawful arrest; (2) the heroin taken from Johnny Yee; (3) Toy's unsigned
statement; and (4) Wong Sun's unsigned statement. 97
The Court held that the warrantless entry of Toy's apartment and bedroom
had-been illegal. Toy was held to have standing to challenge the initial illegal
search and seizure. The Court then applied a straight-forward fruit of the
poisonous tree analysis. Toy's bedroom statements were inadmissible fruits
against Toy. The heroin taken from Johnny Yee was also an inadmissible
fruit against Toy. So was Toy's unsigned confession. The Court quoted
Silverthorne's proposition that illegally procured evidence "shall not be used
at all.''9 s
Wong Sun's case, however, was quite different. Two pieces of evidence
were held to be admissible against Wong Sun. Wong Sun had no standing
to object to the heroin taken from Yee. 99 Wong Sun had no poison tree
from which to claim this fruit derived. Toy's poison-tree was not also Wong
Sun's poison tree. Wong Sun needed his own before the fruits doctrine came
into play.
Wong Sun may, or may not, have had his own poisonous tree. The Court
left aside the question whether Wong Sun was illegally arrested without
probable cause. The attenuation prong of the fruits doctrine made such a
determination unnecessary. Wong Sun had been released on his own recog-
92. Id. at 475.
93. Id. at 475-76. Wong Sun is a pre-Miranda case. Nevertheless, the agent conducting the
interrogation advised Yee, Toy and Wong Sun that each had the "right to withhold information
which might be used against him," and that each "was entitled to the advice of counsel." Id.
None of the three, apparently, tried to exercise their rights.
94. Id. at 476-77.
95. Id. at 477.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 485 (citing Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392).
99. Id. at 492.
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nizance after his arraignment, and "returned voluntarily several days later
to make the statement."'10 "W]e hold," Justice Brennan wrote, "that the
connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.' "1
Three things can be extracted from Wong Sun which have a bearing on
the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda and
Edwards violations. First, the Wong Sun majority apparently narrowed
Nardone's fruits doctrine to constitutional violations alone. Nothing in the
opinion mentions Nardone's alternative "or the law of the land." 2 The
fruits doctrine was to be used to extend the exclusionary rule "in order to
enforce the basic constitutional policies."'' 0 The second major consideration
was whether the facts of the particular case suggested that a defendant's
confession was enough of a voluntary product to break the causal chain
between the fruit and the poison tree. The Court's test was whether the
confession was ."sufficiently an act of free wilt to purge the primary taint
of the unlawful invasion."' 14 A sufficient act of free will meant there was
no fruit, even though there had been a poison tree.los Finally, however, in
making a judgment about attenuation, and the voluntariness of any state-
ment, another test was to be kept in mind. Was the evidence " 'come at
by exploitation of that illegality[?]' "06 If so, the evidence was fruit of the
poison tree and "may not be used." 107
Wong Sun's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, like Nardone's, an-
nounced no bright-line rules.108
III. PROPHYLACTIC SAFEGUARDS
A. Tucker
Michigan v. Tucker'09 brought the issue of whether the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine ever applies to Miranda violations of any kind before
100. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
101. Id. (citing Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).
102. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 340.
103. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485.
104. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
105. This is an interesting notion, and may be the basic rationale underlying both Justice
Rehnquist's refusal to apply the fruits doctrine in Tucker and Justice O'Connor's refusal to
apply it in ERstad.
106. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (citing J. MACumE, EVIDENCE OF GumIT 221 (1959)). In
many ways, this really seems to be the critical inquiry.
107. Id.
108. In fact, Justice Clark wrote in dissent that "[tlhe Court has made a Chinese puzzle
out of [this casel." Id. at 498.
109. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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the Supreme Court for the first time in an unusual manner. The custodial
interrogation at issue occurred before the Miranda decision was handed
down, and Tucker reached the Supreme Court after Miranda was an-
nounced." 0
The defendant Tucker was arrested in connection with the brutal rape and
beating of a 43-year-old Michigan woman. Tucker was taken to a police
station for questioning. The police asked Tucker, among other things,
"whether he wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his constitu-
tional rights.""' Tucker said he did understand his rights, and that he did
not want an attorney." 2 The police then advised Tucker that anything he
said could be used against him in court." 3 The police failed, however, to
advise Tucker that he had the right to appointed counsel." 4
Tucker responded to police questioning by trying to establish an alibi. He
claimed he had been with a friend named Robert Henderson the night of
the rape. At the trial, Henderson contradicted this story in part, and Tucker
was convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty to forty years' imprison-
ment."5
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of a witness
identified in questioning in technical violation of the four warnings required
by Miranda-even though the interrogation pre-dated the Miranda opinion-
had to be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree." 6
Justice Rehnquist called the failure to give the fourth warning "an in-
advertent disregard ... of the procedural rules later established in Mi-
randa. ' "v Technically, even though Tucker's facts occurred pre-Miranda,
the failure to give all the warnings was a poison tree." 8 In keeping with the
technical failure to warn Tucker of all his as yet unannounced Miranda
rights, the court automatically excluded the technical fruit, his confession,
of the technical poison tree. Miranda, at the very least, announced a per se
rule that the first generation derivative evidence of a Miranda violation must
be suppressed. The Supreme Court has never seriously questioned this.
Tucker, in fact, presented the strongest case possible for allowing even the
confession into evidence, and yet the confession was excluded. This is classic
110. The events at issue in Tucker took place April 19, 1966. Miranda was decided June
13, 1966.





116. Id. at 435.
117. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
118. "This Court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles
must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at trial. That requirement was fully complied
with by the state court here: respondent's statements ... were not admitted against him at
trial." Id.
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fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine analysis. The Court, in the Miranda
context, may not explicitly call its analysis fruit of the poison tree doctrine,
but it is.
The real question, in the Miranda context, is whether more remote, second
generation derivative evidence is also to be excluded. In the context of
Tucker's narrow facts, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[tihe question for decision
is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall
be.,"119
Rehnquist's analysis asked three questions. First, was there a constitutional
violation? 20 Or, secondly, was the violation only one of "prophylactic rules
developed to protect that [constitutional] right[?]"' 2' The final issue was
"whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded."'
The potential constitutional right at issue in Tucker was not the sixth
amendment right to counsel.' 23 The only constitutional right potentially at
issue in Tucker, according to Rehnquist, was the fifth amendment right to
be free from "compulsory self-incrimination."' 24 Quoting Elkins v. United
States,"2 Rehnquist wrote that the principal purpose behind the exclusionary
rule is " 'to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "126
"In a proper case," Rehnquist added, "this rationale would seem applicable
to the Fifth Amendment context as well.' ' 27
Tucker was not the appropriate case. Pinpointing both the inadvertence
of the police conduct at issue, and the variance between Tucker's facts and
the "historical circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination,"' 2 Rehnquist held that no constitutional right had been
violated, and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply to the
facts of Tucker. The second generation derivative evidence, Henderson's
third-party testimony, would not be excluded.' 29 "Where there has been
genuine compulsion of testimony," Rehnquist wrote, "the right has been
given broad scope." 130 There had been no genuine compulsion in Tucker.
The police had simply failed to read Tucker a right-to appointed counsel-
that the police did not yet know was required prior to any custodial inter-
rogation.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 451 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
121. Id. at 439.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 438.
124. Id.
125. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
126. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
127. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 444.
129. Id. at 452.
130. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
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The critical distinction in Tucker was that the thing violated was not itself
a constitutional right but only a "prophylactic rulea developed to protect
that right."'' In the context of Tucker's specific facts, the distinction makes
sense. Tucker had been apprised of his general right to counsel in full
compliance with pre-Miranda law. Tucker said he understood he had such
a right, and explicitly said he did not wish to see a lawyer.3 2 The failure,
Re hnquist wrote, was only "to make available to [Tucker] the full measure
of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda."'' 33 Cou-
pled with the inadvertence of the police, Tucker presented a very strong case
for not applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the second
generation derivative evidence.
Rehnquist's opinion, however, suggests three factors-not present in
Tucker-which might just as strongly argue for the application of Wong
Sun's fruits doctrine in the appropriate case. First, a violation of the right
to counsel in Escobedo, 1 4 for example, might be such a case. "We do not
have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois," Rehnquist
wrote, and "Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of
that particular case."' 33 Arguably, the essential Escobedo facts are often
present, however, in the Miranda setting. 36 A person in custodial interro-
gation tries to invoke his right to counsel, and the police refuse to honor
that request. A second factor is whether "the police have engaged in willful,
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of
some right."' 37 Inadvertence falls below that standard. The police must do
something wrong before the exclusionary sanction can have any deterrent
effect. An Escobedo violation, again, would present such a case. The third
factor is related closely to the other two factors. Would "future unlawful
police conduct" actually be deterred? 38 This could be called the limiting
factor of diminishing returns. 39
131. Id. at 439.
132. Id. at 436.
133. Id. at 444.
134. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
135. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 438 (referring the reader to Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,
733-34 (1966); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739
(1969)).
136. Downing, Wilson, Edwards, and Escobedo are just a few instances of police refusal to
honor a custodially interrogated suspect's attempt to invoke his right to counsel.
137. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447. This factor often seems to be at the heart of recent Supreme
Court decisions in fourth, fifth and sixth amendment law. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980).
138. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added).
139. There seems to be no persuasive reason to exclude otherwise reliable evidence using a
deterrence rationale if no actual deterrence will occur. No good faith exception exists outside
the fourth amendment context. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Nevertheless,
a factor approximating police good faith enters the calculus of fifth and sixth amendment cases
also. "Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however," Rehnquist
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Tucker, in light of those three factors, and on its peculiar and historically
limited facts, 140 presented a weak case for application of the full-blown Wong
Sun fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Rehnquist's distinction between
prophylactic safeguards-interchangeably called procedural rules-and con-
stitutional rights was both potent and difficult. The lower courts would
wrench it out of context, however, when confronted with the question of
whether to apply Wong Sun to Edwards violations.1 41 Tucker strongly sug-
gests the fruits doctrine should apply to an Escobedo violation. 42 The im-
plication must be that Miranda not only announced a series of procedural
safeguards-the litany roll call of an arrested person's four rights-but also
something very like a constitutional right. A genuine fifth amendment vi-
olation would bring the fruits doctrine into play, Rehnquist wrote, "in the
proper case.' ' 43 So, impliedly, would an Escobedo violation.' Though the
right announced in Escobedo may not have been a constitutional right in
the fifth amendment's sense, Rehnquist had distinguished Escobedo from
the procedural/prophylactic safeguards at issue in Tucker.
Miranda right to counsel violations and the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine was still an open question after Tucker. 45
observed in Tucker, "the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." 417 U.S. at 447. If
the Court were using a privacy rationale, of course, the extent of the deterrent effect on the
police would make no difference. Deterrence, though, is now the key rationale.
140. Tucker's facts occurred before Miranda was announced. After Miranda there will be
no confusion about the retroactivity of Miranda's rules.
141. In Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982),
for example, the Georgia Supreme Court completely ignored the implication of Justice Rehn-
quist's discussion of Escobedo.
142. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 438.
143. Id. at 447.
144. Id. at 438.
145. There were other approaches suggested to the question of the applicability of the fruits
doctrine to Miranda in the concurrences and dissent to Tucker. Concurring on the grounds
that Tucker's facts occurred pre-Miranda, Justice Brennan suggested the fruits doctrine might
apply to post-Miranda fact patterns. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan
referred readers to the lower court opinions on Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W.2d 712
(1969) and 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971); United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th
Cir. 1971); and People v. Peacock, 39 A.2d 762, 287 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1968), for other
discussions on Miranda and the fruits doctrine. Justice White's concurrence, on the other hand,
suggested that the fruits of Miranda violations involving voluntary confessions should be
admitted. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 460-61 (White, J., concurring). "The same results would not
necessarily obtain with respect to the fruits of involuntary confessions." Id. at 461. This seems
to be the same approach both Rehnquist and O'Connor have taken, although lower courts
have relied on Justice White's concurrence in refusing to exclude derivative evidence. See Wilson
v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442. There was a finding in Wilson that the confession was
voluntary, but the burden of establishing that after an Escobedo or Edwards violation should
be very high. Justice Douglas, the lone dissenter, found absolutely that the fruits doctrine
should apply to any violation of Miranda:
The Court is pot free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a
constitutional basis. We held the 'requirements of warnings and waiver of rights
[to be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege,' . . . [Tucker's]
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B. Elstad: "Cat Out of the Bag"'1 46
In Oregon v. Elstad, 147 the Court considered a related but slightly different
question. Elstad's factual situation, at least, occurred after Miranda.14 If
any doubts had been raised by Tucker's odd procedural history, Elstad
conclusively answered the question whether the fruits doctrine would ever
apply to mere technical violations of Miranda. Elstad held the fruits doctrine
did not apply to violations of Miranda's "prophylactic"' 149 warnings.
Police in the Polk County Sheriffs Office in Salem, Oregon, were con-
tacted by a witness to a burglary in December, 1981. $150,000 in art objects
and other goods had been burgled from a local house.'i 0 The witness im-
plicated 18-year-old Michael Elstad. The police secured an arrest warrant
and drove to Elstad's parents' house. Elstad's mother answered the front
door and escorted the officers to her son's room. Elstad was lying on his
bed listening to his stereo. Elstad accompanied one officer into the living
room. A second officer took Mrs. Elstad into the kitchen to explain the
situation. The first officer asked Elstad if he knew why the police were
there. Elstad said no. The first officer asked Elstad if he knew someone
named Gross. Elstad replied he had heard there had been a robbery at their
house. The officer told Elstad he thought Elstad had been involved. Elstad
replied, " 'Yes, I was there.' ",,5 No Miranda warnings had yet been given.
Elstad was then taken to headquarters. Approximately one hour later the
same officers joined Elstad in an office. Elstad for the first time was advised
statements were thus obtained 'under circumstances that did not meet constitu-
tional standards for protection of the privilege [against self-incrimination].'
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
476, 491 (1966)) (emphasis in original). Again, this approach seems consistent with the others
expressed by different members of the Court. Justice Douglas was simply prepared to find a
constitutional violation at an earlier stage. All the Court members were in apparent agreement
on the test to be applied.
One final case mentioned in Justice White's concurrence is interesting in the Miranda and
fruits context. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), involved both a confession and the second
generation evidence of a gun and ballistics evidence. The court reversed Orozco's conviction
and suppressed his confession. "Although the issue was presented," White noted, "the Court
did not expressly deal with the admissibility of the ballistic tests and gave no intimation that
the evidence was to be excluded at the anticipated retrial." Tucker, 417 U.S. at 461 (White,
J., concurring). The fruits issue was still open after Tucker.
146. " '[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confession, no matter what
the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of
having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag."' Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
311 (1985) (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947)).
147. 470 U.S. 298.
148. Miranda was decided in December 1966. Elstad's facts took place in December 1981.
149. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.




fully of his Miranda rights. Elstad stated he understood his rights, and
waived them. Elstad then confessed a second time. 52
The question in Elstad was whether the second warned confession must
be suppressed as the fruit of the first unwarned confession. The Court,
relying heavily on Tucker, held the fruits doctrine inapplicable here to the
second confession. Once again-just as in Tucker-the Court found the
violation to be one only of "prophylactic" safeguards.' 53
Justice O'Connor tried to go farther than Tucker. O'Connor implied at
the start of her opinion that Wong Sun's fruits doctrine was a fourth
amendment doctrine and inapropos in Miranda's fifth amendment context.
She noted that defendant Elstad's counsel's arguments in favor of suppres-
sion relied heavily on both the fruits and "cat out of the bag" metaphors. 54
The metaphors, O'Connor noted:
should not be used to obscure fundamental differences between the role
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the function of Miranda
in guarding against the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. The Oregon court assumed and
respondent here contends that a failure to administer Miranda warnings
necessarily breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a
constitutional right, so the evidence uncovered following an unwarned
statement must be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'I 5
The Miranda warnings were only prophylactic rules. They were not the fifth
amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination itself. Nor did vio-
lation of Miranda's procedural safeguards rise to the level of fourth amend-
ment violations "which have traditionally mandated a broad application of
the 'fruits' doctrine.' ' 56
O'Connor's opinion thus abandons the initial apparent suggestion that
Wong Sun's poisonous fruits doctrine might not be appropriate outside the
fourth amendment context, and falls more in line with Rehnquist's Tucker
analysis. 1 7
Quoting Tucker, O'Connor writes, the test is whether " '[a] constitutional
privilege' " or only a " 'prophylactic standard' ,,151 has been violated. An
actual violation of a fifth amendment right-of any constitutional right-
apparently would bring the fruits doctrine into play. "If errors are made
by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda pro-
cedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.' ' 59 This is critical in considering
152. Id. at 300.
153. Id. at 318.
154. Id. at 303.
155. Id. at 304.
156. Id. at 306.
157. Compare Tucker, 417 U.S. at 437-52 with Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-13.




whether Wong Sun's extension of the exclusionary rule should apply to
Edwards violations. Elstad suggested at its outset that the fruits doctrine
simply was not applicable to Miranda violations, but ended up repeating
Tucker's test. The essential distinction is whether a prophylactic rule or a
constitutional right has been violated.' 6°
Elstad adds little to an analysis of Miranda right to counsel violations.
All four required Miranda warnings were omitted in Elstad. Elstad's issue
was a general procedural issue. Elstad's focus was primarily on the general
fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. Elstad
simply reiterates the position Rehnquist took in Tucker that the fruits doctrine
might apply to the appropriate Miranda violation. Violations of the reading
of the warnings, both Tucker and Elstad teach, are technical violations of
prophylactic safeguards, and Wong Sun's fruits doctrine does not apply.
The Edwards fruits issue was still open after Elstad.
Curiously enough, despite Justice O'Connor's apparent hostility to Wong
Sun's fruits doctrine in Miranda's fifth amendment context, the Elstad
opinion makes full use of Wong Sun's doctrinal elements.
Elstad's first confession was suppressed. "Miranda requires that the un-
warned admission must be suppressed .... 1 61 The failure to give a defend-
ant in a custodial interrogation setting any warnings is the poison tree. The
confession is the first generation fruit. This is classic fruit of the poisonous
tree analysis. Technically, Wong Sun's fruits doctrine always applies to
Miranda violations. The real question is whether its exclusionary reach en-
compasses more remote generation evidence.
In deciding in Elstad that the second generation evidence-here the sub-
sequent confession to the unwarned confession-was admissible, Justice
O'Connor applied Wong Sun's own test in reaching the conclusion that the
doctrine did not apply. One test was whether "the suspect's choice ... to
exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an 'act
of free will.' "162 This inquiry, verbatim, is Wong Sun's own. O'Connor
later noted, "the causal connection between any psychological disadvantage
created by his admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is speculative
and attenuated at best."' 63 Attenuation is the Wong Sun inquiry to determine
whether the causal connection between the poison tree and the alleged fruit
is so weak that the exclusionary rule should not be applied.' 64 Wong Sun
himself did not benefit from the doctrine which bears his name. Wong Sun's
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 311 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)).
163. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
164. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487 (citing the Nardone test: "[whether] the challenged
evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' " Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
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confession, in contradistinction to Toy's, was held to be voluntary and
admissible.' 65 Justice O'Connor, echoing this prong of Wong Sun, writes,
"[tihe relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also
voluntarily made."'' 66
This Note has suggested that the historical fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, as announced in Silverthorne and Nardone and Wong Sun itself,
is not a bright-line doctrine. Its inquiries are sophisticated and the decision
whether to apply it in a given case depends "on the learning, good sense,
fairness and courage of federal trial judges." 67 Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor both appropriately refused to apply Wong Sun's exclusionary
sanction in the context of Tucker's and Elstad's fact patterns. Tucker and
Elstad both presented cases in which the failure to give the required Miranda
warnings had been inadvertent, and each case additionally involved a defend-
ant who waived his rights and gave a voluntary confession under any rea-
sonable test of voluntariness. 6 Inadvertent errors in the giving of technical
warnings plus subsequent voluntary confessions in the absence of traditional
coercion equals admissibility of second generation derivative evidence in the
context of Miranda's prophylactic safeguards.
Elstad may even stand for the "grand notion" that Wong Sun's fruits
doctrine never applies to Miranda violations in any context. 69 The broadest
reading of Elstad is that Miranda itself is wholly procedural. Miranda is a
prophylactic shield protecting the constitutional right against self-incrimi-
nation. A Miranda violation, under this reading of Elstad, will always be a
technical or prophylactic violation. Second generation evidence, then, will
never be excluded. (The language of Elstad's holding, however, is much
narrower.) 70
Assuming arguendo that this is Elstad's proposition, the possibility still
remains that a Miranda violation may also involve the violation of other
rights.' 7' Miranda's paradox is that it simultaneously comprises both pro-
165. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
166. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
167. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 342.
168. The funny thing about this is that Miranda announced its bright-line rules in part to
try to replace the old voluntariness inquiry. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. Apparently there is
no getting around a determination of voluntariness, and probably there should not be.
169. Professor Craig Bradley, Charles L. Whistler Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington, offered this suggestion in a class session during the autumn 1985
school term.
170. "We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive
questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been
given the requisite Miranda warnings." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
171. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 (citing Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444). "The prophylactic
Miranda warnings therefore are 'not themselves rights protected by the constitution but [are]




phylactic rules and larger rights. The question, in both Tucker's and Elstad's
terms, is whether those rights are constitutional.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Miranda
The source of the paradox is Miranda itself. The confusion comes from
Chief Justice Warren's contradictory purposes in his opinion. Three strands
can be identified. First, Warren was announcing new "procedures." 1 7 2 These
procedures, the familiar warnings, are the things Rehnquist and O'Connor
call prophylactic rights. Secondly, the procedural warnings were established
to "assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate him-
self.' ' 7  This strand is clearly constitutionally based. It is the language of
the fifth amendment itself. The warnings were established to protect this
right. If genuine compelled self-incrimination could be shown, Wong Sun's
fruits doctrine would apply.174 In such a case, however, there would be no
need to rely on a Miranda violation. There would be a full-blown violation
of the Constitution itself. Finally, Miranda tried to join in one opinion rights
recognized in earlier decisions of the Court. "[O]ur holding is not an in-
novation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long rec-
ognized and applied in other settings."' 7 5 Specifically, these were the right
to remain silent, 76 and the right to counsel. 7 7 It is this middle-level strand
which presents the problem. The actual rights to silence and counsel mediate
between the mere prophylactic reading of the procedural warnings and the
constitutional fifth amendment right itself. The question is whether these
mediating rights, in any setting, ever rise to a level requiring the protection
of fully applied constitutional doctrines. 78
172. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
173. Id.
174. This observation is based on comments by Rehnquist in Tucker and O'Connor in Elstad.
The Justices seem to agree the fruits doctrine applies whenever an actual constitutional violation
can be shown. Conceivably, a fifth amendment violation-that is, actual coerced self-incrim-
ination-could be shown completely apart from a Miranda violation. Paradoxically, Miranda,
by focusing the attention of a court on whether the prophylactic rules have been read to a
defendant and their attempted invocation honored, deflects inquiry from the underlying larger
constitutional issue whether the fifth amendment, Miranda wholly aside, has been violated. A
prophylactic shield intended to protect a constitutional right may end by insulating that right
from effective assertion.
175. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
176. Id. at 440.
177. Id.
178. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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The heart of Miranda is the concern Rehnquist expressed in Tucker and
O'Connor expressed in Elstad. The Court wanted to ensure that confessions
were being voluntarily given. "Unless adequate protective devices are em-
ployed," Warren wrote in Miranda, "to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of his free choice."' 79
Rehnquist did not invent the notion of prophylactic safeguards out of
whole cloth. The notion came from Warren's Miranda opinion. Warren's
decision is sprinkled throughout with references to this difficult notion.
"In McNabb, and in Mallory, we recognized both the dangers of inter-
rogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very
fact of interrogation,"' 80 Warren wrote at one point in Miranda. The inherent
compulsions in custodial interrogation required a protective shield for the
fifth amendment right not to self-incriminate against one's will. The four
Miranda warnings were to operate as such a device, but they were not
required.' Other equally effective warnings or devices, as Rehnquist em-
phasized in Tucker, would also suffice.8 2 Therefore, the four warnings-
the reading of the four warnings, that is-could not be constitutional rights.
Early in the opinion Warren calls the four warnings "procedural safe-
guards."'8  These specific four warnings, however, were "to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised .... 11114 Beyond the notion
of prophylaxis, other language in Warren's opinion invited lower courts,
and even the Supreme Court itself, not to accord constitutional status to
Miranda.
Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires ad-
herence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts
at reform, nor it is intended to have this effect.""
The four warnings, then, were like seat belts. If an equally effective device,
such as an air bag, were employed, that would be perfectly fine. A verbatim
reading of the Miranda warnings, then, was only constitutionally suggested,
as crazy as that seems. In his attempt to create the brightest of all bright-
line rules, Warren had constructed instead another Chinese puzzle. Even
though there apparently was a constitutional right to be read some warnings,
there was not a constitutional right to be read the warnings in a constitu-
tionally mandated way.
179. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
180. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 467.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 444.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 467.
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Other things were clearer. Confessions, "in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent"8 6 to the suggested litany of warnings which were "prerequisites
to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant,' 81 7 were always
to be excluded. 8 8 If a defendant indicated he wished "to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease."' 89 Similarly, "if the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."'19 A
suspect could waive these rights, but the government was under a "heavy
burden" 9' to demonstrate such a waiver, and the waiver-was to be judged
by the strict standard of Johnson v. Zerbst.'92 In selecting Zerbst as the
Miranda waiver standard, Warren wrote, "[t]his Court has always set high
standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights."' 93
Warren was not writing about the fifth amendment right to be free from
self-incrimination, nor was he writing about the prophylactic warnings. War-
ren had in mind, rather, the intermediate rights, the rights to silence and
counsel. The Zerbst waiver standard was to be applied to the government's
assertion of a waiver of those rights.
The right to silence-although outside the scope of this Note-was a
constitutional right. In fact, it was a very old right. "The privilege was
elevated to constitutional status," Warren wrote in a review of its history,
"and has always been 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard.' "94 Malloy v. Hogan'9 reiterated that view.
Warren had more extensive things to say about the constitutional basis
for the right to counsel. The extent of that right in the context of custodial
interrogation-which was the precise Miranda setting-had been announced
two years earlier in Escobedo v. Illinois.196 Warren, in fact, undertook his
analysis in Miranda with a backward look to Escobedo.197
"Statements," taken in violation of Escobedo, "were constitutionally in-
admissible.' 9 8 Escobedo "was but an explication of basic rights that are
enshrined in our Constitution . . . ." The basic rights protected in Esco-
bedo were two. Quoting the Constitution, Warren wrote, "No person ...
186. Id. at 476.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 474.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 475.
192. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). A Zerbst waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made.
193. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 459-60 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)) (emphasis
added).
195. 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
196. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
197. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 442.
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shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' "
and that " 'the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel .... ' "200
In footnote thirty-five of Miranda, Warren made the constitutional meaning
of Escobedo crystal clear: "[In Escobedo] [t]he police also prevented the
attorney from consulting with his client. Independent of any other consti-
tutional proscription, this action constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel and excludes any statement obtained
in its Wake. ' 201
Miranda. explicitly reaffirmed Escobedo right at the start of Warren's
opinion.202 It is fundamental sixth amendment law that the sixth amendment's
right to counsel attaches at the start of adversary proceedings. 20 3 Miranda,
reiterating the Court's position in Escobedo, found that moment to be:
"when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody
at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings
commences.'204 Miranda went even further. The sixth amendment right to
counsel, according to both Escobedo and Miranda, attached as soon as
custodial interrogation began, warnings or no warnings. According to War-
ren, in Miranda the sixth amendment right to counsel could kick in even
before custodial interrogation began. All a suspect had to do was ask for
an attorney. "An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for
a lawyer ... [but] such request affirmatively secures his right to have one. 20
There is no need to try to prove too much from this. Miranda is a long
and complicated opinion. It comprehends both the notion that it is an-
nouncing bright-line prophylactic nonconstitutionally mandated rules and the
notion that it is reaffirming previously recognized constitutional rights. The
dichotomy between a prophylactic rule and a constitutional right-when
both came clothed in precisely the same language-was guaranteed to cause
confusion. When Miranda's paradox was added to Wong Sun's Chinese
puzzle, there was even greater complexity. The jurisdictional split over the
application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to Edwards2°6 violations
was inevitable.
It is easy to lose sight of the big picture when lost in the intricacies of
competing doctrines and complicated cases. Warren steeped himself in the
literature of the fifth amendment before writing Miranda. Two of the quotes
200. Id. (quoting the language of the fifth and sixth amendments).
201. Id. at 465 n.35 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 442.
203. For a short, elegant analysis of when the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, see
S. Smith, A Good Faith Exception to the Right to Counsel (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
204. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
205. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
206. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980).
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Warren used in Miranda have relevance to the Edwards fruits issue. Warren
quoted the Wickersham Commission Report:
[I]n the language of the present Lord Chancellor of England . "It is
not admissible to do a great right by doing a little wrong .... It is not
sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper result by irregular or
improper means." Not only does the use of the third degree involve a
flagrant violation of law by the officers of the law, but it involves also
the dangers of false confessions, and it tends to make police and pros-
ecutors less zealous in the search for objective evidence. As the New
York prosecutor quoted in the report said, "It is a short cut and makes
the police lazy and unenterprising."-
Earlier, in a section of Miranda concerned with the judicial role vis-h-vis
the Constitution, Warren quoted from Weems v. United States.2 8 "[The
Constitution's] general principles would have little value and be converted
by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas [if judges failed to fulfill
their roles]. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.''209
Citing Silverthorne, Warren wrote in Miranda, "it was necessary in Es-
cobedo... to insure. . . what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not
become but a 'form of words,' in the hands of government officials. And
it is in this spirit, consistent with our role as judges, that we adhere to the
principles of Escobedo today." 210
B. "What About Escobedo?" 211
Escobedo, as noted earlier, has been limited to its facts. 21 2 Escobedo,
however, has not been overruled. Escobedo, despite its place of prominence
in Miranda, has simply been overlooked. Even assuming arguendo that
Escobedo must be limited to its facts, it makes the strongest possible ar-
207. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447 (citing IV National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) (Wickersham Commission
Report) (emphasis added)). Ignoring a suspect's request for counsel is not the third degree, but
it is a short cut nevertheless.
208. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
209. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added)).
210. Id. at 444 (citation omitted) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920)) (emphasis added).
211. See discussion in 38 Cgiui. L. REP. (BNA) 4096 (1985). Justice Marshall asked a gov-
ernment lawyer during oral argument in the then pending case of Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d
178 (1st Cir. 1985) (involving the attempt by a third party to assert a suspect's right to counsel
without the suspect's knowledge, and the withholding from the suspect of information of that
third party's attempt) whether Escobedo would be addressed by the government. The government
lawyer answered that "Escobedo was a dead end." 38 Caus. L. REP. (BNA) at 4096. Since
Escobedo arguably stands for the proposition that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches
at the point custodial interrogation begins, regardless of whether that right is invoked by the
suspect, Escobedo would per se be a dead end for the government's position. Maybe it is time
for Escobedo to be resurrected.
212. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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gument that the thing violated in an Edwards setting is nothing less than
the sixth amendment right to counsel.
On the night of January 19, 1960, Escobedo's brother-in-law was shot
and killed. Escobedo was arrested at 2:30 the next morning without a
warrant, was interrogated, and released on a writ of habeas corpus at five
the afternoon of the same day. The writ had been secured by Escobedo's
lawyer. Escobedo had made no statement to the police.
2 3
Another prisoner in custody subsequently identified Escobedo to police as
the firer of the fatal shots. Escobedo was arrested a second time on January
30, 1960. Escobedo gave uncontradicted testimony at trial that " '[the]
detective[s] said they had us pretty well, up pretty tight, and we might as
well admit to this crime.' " Escobedo refused the gambit; he testified that
he told the detectives, " 'I am sorry but I would like to have advice from
my lawyer.' ",214 Of critical importance for this Note's purposes, Escobedo
had not yet been formally charged. The existing situation when Escobedo
made his first request to see his lawyer was custodial interrogation. 25
Escobedo, a 22-year-old male of Mexican descent, was then subjected to
a long period of interrogation. Escobedo's lawyer was at the police station,
and repeatedly asked to see his client. Escobedo himself repeatedly asked to
see his lawyer. Escobedo's lawyer was told to go get another writ of habeas
corpus. Escobedo was told that his lawyer " 'didn't want to see him.' ",216
Testimony indicated Escobedo was handcuffed in a standing position, had
dark circles under his eyes, and was nervous, upset, and agitated because
he had not slept properly in over a week. 21 7
The police confronted Escobedo with the informant's claim that Escobedo
had shot his brother-in-law. Escobedo said the informant was lying. Asked
if he would repeat that to the informant, Escobedo replied, " 'yes.' "2181 The
informant was brought into the room with Escobedo. Escobedo said, " 'I
didn't shoot Manuel, you did it.' "219 This was the first time Escobedo
admitted any knowledge of the crime. Escobedo made further incriminating
statements. The police then brought in an assistant state's attorney to take
Escobedo's formal statement. At no time during the interrogation, nor during
the taking of the formal statement, was Escobedo informed of his consti-
tutional rights. 220 The issue certified to the Supreme Court was whether
213. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 480-81.
217. Id. at 482.
218. Id.




Escobedo's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated in these
circumstances .221
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Escobedo's constitutional
sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated.
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accu-
satory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the cir-
cumstances here, [where Escobedo's lawyer was present at the police
station] the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.2
Escobedo adds two critical factors to the calculus of the issue under review
in this Note. The first is the factor present in every Edwards-tainted violation.
A person held in custody by the police asks for the assistance of counsel,
and that request is denied, or, as the Escobedo opinion worded it, "the
suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer." 223 The more interesting factor is the Escobedo Court's holding that
the moment the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches is not the moment
when the formal arraignment or indictment occurs but is, instead, nothing
more or less than the moment of custodial interrogation.32 Escobedo teaches
that once there is custodial interrogation, and a suspect asks the aid of a
lawyer and the police refuse that request, the sixth amendment right to
counsel has fully attached. 225 The Escobedo right to counsel, once invoked,
is the full-blown constitutional sixth amendment right. -
"The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally
indicted," Justice Goldberg wrote, "[b]ut in the context of this case, that
fact should make no difference .... [Escobedo] had become the accused,
and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to confess . . . despite
his constitutional right not to -do so.' '226 Ruling that the sixth amendment
counsel right attaches at the moment of custodial interrogation made all the
sense in the world. "It would exalt form over substance," Goldberg later
wrote, "to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on
whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal
indictment. Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged
with murder. ' 227 Professor Yale Kamisar has made the same point228 in his
221. Id. at 479, 484.
222. Id. at 492.
223. Id. at 491.
224. Id. at 495.
225. Id. at 491.
226. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 486.
228. Y. KAMISA, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 211 (1980).
In some cases the evidence against the accused may be stronger at the moment
of arrest than it may be in other cases when the indictment is returned (or, to
update this rule in light of Brewer v. Williams, judicial proceedings have com-
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discussion of Brewer v. Williams.29 The moment of the attaching of the
sixth amendment right to counsel should not be left to police-or state-
manipulation. Formal charges can be delayed. The recognized rule in criminal
procedure is that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment attaches
whenever "the critical stage" takes place. In Escobedo the critical stage was
moved up to custodial interrogation. "[The circumstance in Escobedo] was
a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama."2' 0
The core of Escobedo is that a right must be given wide enough scope to
ensure the effectiveness of that right. "[N]o meaningful distinction can be
drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indict-
ment," 2 '1 Goldberg wrote for the Escobedo majority. It is hard to quarrel
with the observation.
The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when
few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship
between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a
confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need
for legal advice. 2
Recent Supreme court decisions involving the sixth amendment, without
disavowing Escobedo, have retreated from its finding that the right to counsel
attaches at the moment of custodial interrogation, or have ignored that
holding.23
Even Chief Justice Warren in Miranda failed to highlight this most im-
portant of Escobedo's teachings. In pointedly reaffirming Escobedo in
Miranda, and even trying to extend Escobedo's logic, Warren lost sight of
Escobedo's most critical ruling. In the massiveness of the Miranda opinion,
Warren only twice mentioned Escobedo's-and, also, Miranda's-most cru-
cial fact. Too fine metaphorical distinctions-the supersubtle bifurcation
between prophylactic and consitutional rights-obscured the brightness of
Escobedo's holding. In announcing its constitutionally suggested nonman-
dated bright-line rules, Miranda tarnished the bright-line rule Escobedo had
announced less than two years earlier.
Escobedo's was the brightest of all possible rules. There was a sixth
amendment right to counsel which attached at the moment of custodial
interrogation, and it came from the Constitution. 4 The question yet un-
menced). It is hardly realistic to assume that a defendant is less in need of counsel
an hour before indictment (or the initiation of judicial proceedings) than he is
an hour after ....
Id. This is a wonderfully provocative essay in a book devoted to fifth and sixth amendment
problems. See also id. at 28.
229. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
230. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486 (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)).
231. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.
232. Id. at 488.
233. See, e.g., Brewer, 430 U.S. 387; infra notes 256-82 and accompanying text.
234. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
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answered, but raised by Edwards, is what impact a suspect's request for
counsel has when the suspect, unlike Escobedo, has not yet secured a lawyer
or the lawyer is not present at the police station.
C. Edwards
In Edwards v. Arizona,235 the Supreme Court once again took up the
general issue of when the right to counsel attaches. Once again a suspect in
custodial interrogation requested assistance of counsel, and the request was
not honored by police. 2 6 Edwards' historical facts are cheek-and-jowl with
the facts in Escobedo except that the suspect in Edwards did not yet have
a lawyer. Two additional circumstances are also different. Edwards post-
dated the Court's decision in Miranda; and the Court decided the case under
the fifth amendment, although the sixth amendment right to counsel issue
was also certified. For the purposes of this Note, the fundamental question
Edwards raises is whether the reading of Miranda's warnings, at least until
indictment or arraignment or formal judicial proceedings have begun, ef-
fectively blocks a suspect from his sixth amendment right to counsel when
the suspect has no lawyer. The Court did find a fifth amendment right to
counsel violation in Edwards.237
After Edwards there were two decisions out from the Supreme Court on
the consequences of the police not honoring a suspect's invocation of his
right to counsel. Escobedo held this was a full-fledged sixth amendment
right. 238 Edwards found the right in the fifth.239 Paradoxically, the unwarned
defendant in an. Escobedo situation may end up in a better position than
the warned defendant in an Edwards setting. An Escobedo violation is a
violation of constitutional rights. 240 By deciding Edwards under the fifth
amendment, the Supreme Court left unclear once more whether the violated
right was constitutional in nature, or merely prophylactic. 24'
On January 19, 1976, an arrest warrant was issued in Arizona against the
defendant Edwards based on a complaint charging Edwards with robbery,
burglary, and first-degree murder. Edwards was arrested the same day. 242
At the police station, Edwards was read his Miranda rights. Edwards said
235. 451 U.S. 477.
236. Id. at 479.
237. Id. at 484-85.
238. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
239. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-86.
240. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
241. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. This discussion in Edwards seems to indicate that both
the rights to silence and counsel are procedural in the Miranda context, but that the right to
counsel is more important than the right to silence. See infra note 254; see also Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
242. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
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he understood his rights and was willing to be questioned. Just as in Es-
cobedo, Edwards was told another suspect in custody had implicated him.
Edwards denied involvement, gave a taped alibi statement, and tried to strike
a deal.23 An officer said he had no authority to make a deal, and gave
Edwards the phone number of a county attorney. Edwards made a phone
call, but hung up shortly thereafter. " 'I want an attorney before making
a deal,' " Edwards said. Interrogation, as Miranda required, immediately
ceased. 2"
The next morning two new detectives arrived at the jail and asked to see
Edwards. The officers told Edwards they wanted to speak with him. Edwards
said he did not want to talk to them; Edwards was told " 'he had' " to
talk. Edwards was again read his Miranda rights. Edwards asked to hear
the tape of the custodial suspect who had implicated him. After hearing the
tape, Edwards agreed to talk, but refused to have his own comments taped.
Edwards then implicated himself. Edwards had not reasserted his right to
counsel on the second day of interrogation.245
Except for the fact that Edwards did not yet have a lawyer and the
interposition of the reading of the Miranda warnings, the facts in Edwards
are essentially the same as those in Escobedo.2A6 The Supreme Court in
Edwards never once mentioned Escobedo, however. There is a good pos-
sibility the Court was simply deciding Edwards in light of its decision in
Michigan v. Mosley.247 In Mosley the Court had held that interrogation must
cease after the right to silence under Miranda had been asserted. At an
unspecified future time, though, the police could once again attempt to
question a Mosley defendant. The Court in Edwards held the right to counsel
required greater protection than the right to silence. 24"
The thrust of Edwards is not the scope of a suspect's rights once in
custody, but the scope of permissible activity allowed the police in the
interrogation process:
[A]nd we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his
243. Id. at 478-79.
244. Id. at 479.
245. Id.
246. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478-79; supra notes 211-34 and accompanying text.
247. 423 U.S. 96 (involving a second session of interrogation after the suspect had invoked
his right to silence). Under Mosely's specific facts, the Court allowed the confession obtained
during the second interrogation session into evidence.
248. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The police are not allowed to initiate further communication
with an Edwards suspect until the suspect has been provided a lawyer unless the suspect himself
initiates the exchange. The Edwards right to counsel, otherwise never lapses. The Mosley right
to silence on the other hand does not attach for all time once invoked by a defendant. If
enough time passes the police are allowed to attempt to question the suspect again.
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rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having ex-
pressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communi-
cation, exchanges, or conversations with the police.29
The scope and source of the suspect's right to counsel was not fully explored
in Edwards. That right came from the fifth amendment,210 and was an-
nounced in Miranda.25' The real inquiries in Edwards were: (I) whether
Edwards or the police initiated further interrogation after Edwards asked
for counsel; and (2) whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel on day two after its invocation on day one.
The Edwards Court repeatedly emphasized, nevertheless, that the right to
counsel, once invoked, was a special right. 2 2 Justice White, quoting Fare v.
Michael C.25 with approval, noted the Court in that case had "referred to
Miranda's rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation
cease. ' 25 4 The difficulty for other courts trying to decide whether to apply
Wong Sun's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to an Edwards violation is
that Edwards does not explicitly distinguish between fifth amendment pro-
phylactic and constitutional rights.
At one point in his opinion, Justice White did write, "the fruits of the
interrogation initiated by the police on January 20 could not be used against
Edwards . . . . 2- There is no mention of Wong Sun or Nardone or Sil-
verthorne, however. In the context of Miranda, as this Note has earlier
explained, a confession is always the first-generation fruit of the poison tree
police refusal to honor the attempted invocation of the right to counsel.
249. Id. (footnote omitted).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 484-85.
252. Id. at 485.
253. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
254. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (citing Michael C., 442 U.S. at 719) (emphasis added). Trying
to unpack the meaning of these cases is sometimes as difficult as reading the tax code. Retracing
one's steps from Edwards through Michael C. back to Miranda's source waters, one finds this:
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 ... (1962), we stated: "lilt is settled
that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request." This proposition applies with
equal force in the context of providing counsel to protect an accused's Fifth
Amendment privilege in the face of interrogation.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. This comports perfectly with the constitutional scope of the right
to counsel announced two years earlier in Escobedo. Of course, the Escobedo right came from
the sixth amendment. This passage in Miranda clearly says the right to counsel under discussion
is a fifth amendment right. The portions of Miranda which discuss the prophylactic nature of
this right do not square as easily with this language. The solution might simply be that a
constitutional right can simultaneously be a prophylactic right protecting another constitutional
right.
255. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
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The language of Edwards seems to indicate the fruits doctrine of Wong Sun
would apply to Edwards violations, but in the absence of a Suprbme Court
decision holding second-generation derivative evidence suppressible, the ques-
tion remains open.
There seems no principled reason to favor the unwarned defendant under
Escobedo who asserts his right to counsel from the warned defendant under
Edwards and Miranda who asserts his right to counsel. An Escobedo defend-
ant should not be constitutionally favored because counsel has already been
secured and is present at the police station. The fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine should apply, or not apply, equally to both situations. The giving
of the Miranda warnings, even if invoked, should not operate as a shield
deflecting suspects from full assertion of their constitutional rights. Since
the factual settings in both the fifth and sixth amendment settings are virtually
identical, at least once the right to counsel has been asserted, the doctrinal
consequences under the constitution ought to be the same.
D. The Sixth Amendment Counsel Right256
Once the sixth amendment counsel right attaches, the full scope of Wong
Sun's fruit of the poisonous tree exclusionary rule theoretically applies. The
famous "Christian burial speech" case of Brewer v. Williams 257 apparently
answered the question whether the fruits doctrine fully applies once a court
finds a sixth amendment right to counsel violation.
In Brewer, the defendant Robert Williams turned himself in to the police
in Davenport, Iowa, on the advice of his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams
had been accused of kidnapping a ten-year-old girl on Christmas Eve 1968
from the Des Moines YMCA.21 He was later convicted in the Iowa state
courts of murder.259
256. The issue of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and its application to Miranda
right to counsel violations implicates fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment concerns. Among the
leading sixth amendment cases are Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); and especially Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the wide scope of the sixth amendment counsel right in Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477
(1985) (extending Henry to setting outside the police controlled atmosphere of the station-house).
See also Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
Among the scholarly works helpful in the preparation of this Note were: George, The Fruits
of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 478 (1967); Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 865 (1981); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99; and Note, Miranda Without Warning: Derivative Evidence
as Forbidden Fruit, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 325 (1974).
257. 430 U.S. 387.
258. Id. at 390.
259. Id. at 389.
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At the Davenport jail, Williams secured a second lawyer. Both lawyers
advised Williams not to make a statement to police until he had been returned
to Des Moines and had consulted again with his Des Moines lawyer. The
Davenport police were aware of all of this.260
Before being driven back to Des Moines, Williams was arraigned before
a Davenport judge.261 The judge advised Williams of his Miranda rights.
The day Williams was driven by two police officers back to Des Moines,
he was once again advised of his Miranda rights.262 On the snowy ride to
Des Moines, Williams was urged to consider the miserable winter weather
conditions and the possibility the girl's body might never be found, and the
need to give her a " 'Christian burial.' "263 Williams then implicated himself
by both word and deed. Among other things, Williams led the two officers
to the buried body. 264
The Supreme Court decided Brewer v. Williams under the sixth amend-
ment. 265 Although the facts of the case suggested Miranda could have been
the basis for its decision, the Court chose to rely on Massiah v. United
States266 instead. The chief distinction between the fifth and sixth amendment
rights to counsel, if there is such a distinction, is that the sixth amendment
right automatically attaches:
Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to
the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him-"whether by way of formal charge, prelim-
inary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."267
The Edwards counsel right in contrast, and maybe even the Escobedo right,
perhaps have to be asserted by the defendant. Under the Massiah doctrine,
as exemplified in Brewer v. Williams, the attaching of the counsel right did
not depend on its assertion.261
Having found a Massiah sixth amendment right, a court must apply two
tests: First, was there a valid waiver of that right? The standard again is
the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of " 'an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right of privilege.' "269 Second, under Massiah, were
the defendant's incriminating statements "deliberately elicited"? 270
260. Id. at 390-91.
261. Id. at 391.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 392-93.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 398.
266. 377 U.S. 201.
267. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
268. See Brewer, 430 U.S. 387; Massiah, 377 U.S. 201.
269. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464).
270. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. In Massiah, Justice Stewart wrote, "We hold that the petitioner
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In Brewer, the Court found no waiver of the right to counsel, and that
Detective Learning's speech had deliberately elicited the incriminating evi-
dence from Williams. 27' "[S]o clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments as here occurred cannot be condoned." 272
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's
decision that Williams' sixth amendment rights had been violated.273 Both
his statements to Detective Learning and evidence of finding the body were
suppressed. 274
This seems to be a classic application of the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine to both first-generation and second-generation derivative evidence.
Nothing is ever simple in criminal procedure, however. After affirming the
judgement of the Eighth Circuit, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
attached a footnote:
The District Court stated that its decision "does not touch upon the
issue of what evidence, if any, beyond the incriminating statements
themselves must be excluded as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.' " We, too,
have no occasion to address this issue.... While neither Williams'
incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony describing his
having led the police to the victim's body can constitutionally be admitted
into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition
might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been
discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been
elicited from Williams.2 5
The essence of Justice Stewart's footnote twelve in Brewer is not that the
fruits doctrine does not apply in the sixth amendment context, but that the
harshness of that doctrine might be softened a little by the creation of
another device which would supplement the independent source and atten-
uation components of Wong Sun's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. 276
The case returned to the Iowa state courts, and both the Iowa Supreme
Court and the United States District Court affirmed Williams' second con-
viction under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.277
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the new exception in Nix
v. Williams.27
was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from
him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." Id. (emphasis added).
271. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405.
272. Id. at 406.
273. Id. at 405.
274. Id. The Supreme Court actually affirmed the suspension of the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus which would have set Williams free.
275. Id. at 406-07 n.12 (citation omitted).
276. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 0963).
277. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431.
278. Id.
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After Nix v. Williams there could no longer be any doubt that the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine at least sometimes applied to violations of
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment rights. As the Court observed:
Although Silverthorne and Wong Sun involved violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the "fruit of the Poisonous tree" doctrine has not beeri
limited to cases in which there has been a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court has applied the doctrine where the violations were of the Sixth
Amendment, see United States v. Wade,'791 ... as well s of the Fifth
Amendmeit.m
The adoption of the inevitable discovery exception was calculated to even
the balance of interests at issue when applying the fruits doctrine to violations
of constitutional rights. The fruits doctrine had been created by the Supreme
Court in Silverthorne and its progeny to give full effect to the exclusionary
rule announced by Weeks, and Weeks had announced its sanction to give
effective force to constitutional fourth amendment rights. Strict application
of the fruits doctrine, however, could at times produce unwanted results.
In Brewer v. Williams, for example, there was only one dead body, and
that body could only be found once. Since the body would have been found
without the police misconduct, suppression of the body would have shifted
the balance too far in the defendant's favor.
The Court had invented the doctrine which had made the corpus delicti
and all evidence relating to that body disappear. 281 The law, after the requisite
showing had been made,282 made the body reappear. The fruits doctrine was
supplemented by the inevitable discovery exception.
A doctrine one Supreme Court Justice had called a "chinese puzzle" was
touched by another Supreme Court Justice's sleight-of-hand. The fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine now offers the possibility that constructive inev-
itably discovered evidence can be admissible. This is simply a reasonable
elaboration and refinement of existing doctrine.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did apply to fourth, fifth and
sixth amendment constitutional violations. The open question was still whether
an Edwards violation was constitutional or not.
V. CONCLUSION
A person is suspected of having committed a crime. The police arrest her.
No formal charges are filed. There is no preliminary hearing, indictment,
279. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
280. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) in the
fifth amendment context).
281. Theoretically, this is the practical effect of the full application of Silverthorne's and
Wong Sun's fruits doctrine.
282. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444-45 n.5.
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information, or arraignment. 28 3 The woman is simply being detained by the
police under a valid arrest warrant, or otherwise. From the point of view
of the police, there is no reason to file formal charges until they secure
more information from the woman that would justify the institution of
judicial proceedings.
The pdlice desire to question the woman. She is properly advised of all
four of her Miranda rights. The woman says she understands her rights,
and asks for the help of a lawyer. The police refuse to honor the request.
The woman is confronted with an informant who implicates her. The woman
reacts to this deliberate elicitatioin and incriminates herself. The woman then
gives a fuller statement. The police have both a confession and the evidence
developed by taking advantage of information from thd confession. The
stage of the criminal process has not passed beyond custodial interrogation,
and yet the woman's fate is sealed unless the derivative evidence is excluded
along with her confession.
Had judicial proceedings begun-"whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment"24-the wom-
an's sixth amendment right to counsel would have been deemed to have
attached at law, and without the need for that right's assertion; or, if the
woman's lawyer were at the police station and she asked to see counsel,
Escobedo teaches that the woman's sixth amendment right would also have
attached. One of the Miranda warnings tells the woman she has the right
to counsel. The woman asserts that right. Edwards held that the woman's
fifth amendment right to counsel has now attached. The question is whether
the scope of the Edwards right to counsel should be narrower than the
general sixth amendment right to counsel.
The history of the exclusionary rule from Weeks v. United States285 to
Mapp v. Ohio286 has some bearing on this issue. Wolf v. Colorado287 held
that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth,
but Wolf specifically failed to impose Weeks' exclusionary remedy on the
state courts.281 Mapp rectified the oversight:
[We can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to
be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment., 9
283. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
284. Id.
285. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
286. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
287. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
288. Id.
289. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. See also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).
'The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such
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The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, itself an extension of the Weeks
doctrine, should apply to Edwards right to counsel violations for the same
reason. Elstad should be read to mean that the fruits doctrine does not apply
to procedural Miranda violations, but does apply to constitutional violations.
The police should not be doubly encouraged to manipulate the law to
evade the exclusionary sanction of constitutional doctrines. By allowing
second-generation derivative evidence to be admissible, courts encourage the
police in two wrongs. They invite the police to disregard a custodial suspect's
request for the aid of counsel. The confession itself under Miranda will be
per se inadmissible. The second-generation derivative evidence may not be
as damaging to the suspect, but, in the eyes of the police, it is better than
no evidence at all. The purpose of the exclusionary sanction is to deter
improper police behavior. Even Tucker suggests the behavior of the police
at issue in Edwards is the very behavior to which the exclusionary rule of
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should apply. 29° Beyond that, the
police are encouraged to delay the institution of formal judicial proceedings.
There is no reason for the courts to grant the police the power to delay the
attaching of a suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel.
Escobedo should be vigorously reapplied. The logical time for the sixth
amendment right to attach is the moment when custodial interrogation be-
gins. Miranda would have more force in logic, and at law, if it were
interpreted by the Supreme Court to have incorporated that portion of
Escobedo's holding. Subsequent sixth amendment cases have not departed
from Escobedo. They have stated only that the sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches at least at the institution of judicial proceedings.
Miranda's distinction between prophylactic and constitutional rights is a
difficult concept. When interpreted properly, however, as both the Tucker
and Elstad Courts interpreted it, the distinction makes sense. A right to be
read a set of rules differs from the rights those rules represent. Various
courts have held post-Miranda that the rights to silence and counsel-both
as read, and when invoked-are merely prophylactic devices protecting the
fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. The
better weight of authority is that the rights to silence and counsel are
constitutional rights themselves. 291 The use of one constitutional right to
invasions.' . . . As subsequent cases have confirmed, the exclusionary sanction applies to any
'fruits' of a constitutional violation .... Crews, 445 U.S. at 470 (citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)).
290. Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974).
291. Though beyond the scope of this Note, the fruits doctrine should be equally applicable
to police violations of a suspect's attempt to invoke the right to silence. This Note has focused
on the sixth and fifth amendment rights to counsel because the United States Supreme Court




protect another constitutional right should not make the first constitutional
right any less worthy of protection when that right is violated.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is the most flexible of judicially-
created devices. It is utilized by courts to ensure that the scope of consti-
tutional rights is wide enough to be effective. Refusal by the police to honor
a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel in an Edwards setting is
indistinguishable in principle from the same refusal in Escobedo. Consti-
tutionally, the two fact patterns should be treated the same. Escobedo's is
an explicit sixth amendment violation. Whether an Edwards violation is
called a fifth or sixth amendment violation should be immaterial. The in-
terposition of the reading of Miranda's prophylactic rules should not change
a thing. The same consequences should attach. The fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine should apply to both situations.
The right to counsel at issue in both cases is the same. At the very least,
once invoked, the courts should reaffirm the earlier Supreme Court holding
that this right to counsel is a constitutional right. The fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, especially as applied in Nix v. Williams,292 gives courts wide
enough latitude to accommodate any unusual circumstances. The doctrinal
elements of independent source, attenuation, and inevitable discovery, as
well as the general voluntariness inquiry, are adequate devices to allow courts
to use their discretion in deciding whether or not to exclude second-generation
derivative evidence after an Edwards violation.
Saying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to Edwards vio-
lations does not mean all second-generation derivative evidence will auto-
matically be inadmissible. Only evidence that comes from police exploitation
or police illegality should be inadmissible. In this calculus of criminal pro-
cedure, the character of the police impropriety will be a factor of varying
weight. The more deliberate, knowing and willful the police illegality, the
more appropriate the use of the fruit of the poisonous tree's exclusionary
sanction will be. It is a simple thing, though, to honor an Edwards or
Escobedo request for counsel. Any justification offered by the police for
failure to honor that request, or any claim that the invocation of the right
was later waived, should be viewed skeptically by the courts. The "heavy
burden" on the government to show a knowing and intelligent waiver under
Johnson v. Zerbst is sufficient. 293
The bright-line rules Miranda v. Arizona announced, the so-called pro-
phylactic safeguards, should not be allowed to block the effective assertion
292. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
293. For a clear and excellent discussion contrasting a bright-line model with a quasi-tort
model in the fourth amendment context, see Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,
83 MICH. L. R-v. 1468 (1985). The same approach could be used in the fifth and sixth amendment
right-to-counsel settings.
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of other rights, constitutional in nature, which Miranda reaffirmed. Meta-
phorical devices should not be allowed to obscure and confuse thought. The
right to counsel, once invoked by a suspect in a custodial interrogation
setting whatever its source, is more than a mere procedural device. The
courts should closely examine deliberate Edwards violations by the police.
Wong Sun's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should apply with its full
and reasonable vigor to second generation derivative evidence after an Ed-
wards violation.
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